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Unhousing the Urban Poor: The Reagan Legacy*
BETH A. RUBIN, JAMES D. WRIGHT,
AND JOEL A. DEVINE
Tulane University
Department of Sociology
The Reagan era was characterized by the popularity of individual level
explanations and market based solutions for a range of social problems,
including homelessness. We argue that such an approach was inade-
quate and may, in fact, have toorsened the housing situation. We claim
that homelessness is fundamentally a housing problem linked to two key
trends of the 198Os: the increasing rate of poverty and the declining sup-
ply'f low-income housing. Market approaches to housing policy have
resulted in housing policies by default: gentrification, condo conversion
and displacement as well as tax policies that explicitly favor the non-
poor. Those policies gehred towards the poor, vouchers and subsidies,
were inadequate responses to increasing need. In suin, the Reagan years
witnessed dramatic declines in the supply of low-cost housing, substan-
tial increases in the poverty rate, and drastic shifts in federal policy
towards housing the poor.
A sample of homeless people in San Francisco was once
asked to identify "the most important issues you face or prob-
lems you have trying to make it in San Francisco or generally
in life" (Ball and Havassy, 1984). The most common responses
were "no place to live indoors" (mentioned by 94%), followed
by "no money" (mentioned by 88%). No other response was
chosen by as much as half the sample. At a sufficiently abstract
level, the connections between poverty, the housing supply, and
homelessness may seem dim. At the level where life is lived,
the connections are stunningly obvious.
The clarity of perception revealed in these results may be
usefully contrasted with a piece by Randall Filer, "What do
we really know about the homeless," that appeared in the Wall
Our thanks to Brian T. Smith for comments on previous drafts and to
Martha Wittig for research assistance.
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Street Journal (10 April 1990). Filer is skeptical that homeless-
ness has become a social problem that requires g ove,'nment
intervention. Like others, he views welfare benefits, Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) and any other "citizen
wage" as a threat to the market because they reward the poor
for being poor (or the homeless for being homeless). " . . . ITihe
more generous the programns for the homeless are, the greater
this number [of honelessl will be as people respond to the in-
centives created." He adds, "Despite the implication of the word
'homeless,' we know almost nothing about the comwielion be-
tween homelessness and housing markets. There is no reliable
evidence that homelessness is more extensive in cities wilh tight
housing markets."
Filer's comments mislead; as we argue in this paper, there
certainly is a relationship between the housing inarkut and
homelessness. The relationship is rather a simple one: the cost
of housing has come to exceed what many impoverished fam-
ilies and persons can afford to pay. We also argue that Filer's
sentiments, although incorrect, were shared by President Rea-
gan throughout his administration and were institutionalized in
budgets and policies that exacerbated the homelessness prob-
lem. As a result, the homeless situation was much worse at the
end of the decade of the 1980s than it had been at the begin-
ning. Unhousing the urban poor is a lamentable but enduring
legacy of his administration.
Ferrara (1990, p. 539) has pointed to increasing levels of
Federal expenditure to aid the homeless as evidence of Rea-
gan's merit. For example, he notes that expenditures in tie De-
patment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) increased
from $12.5 billion in 1980 to an estimated $22.8 billion in 1990.
But these figures do not reflect expenditures on low-incone
housing programs or on the homeless; they are, rather, total
IIUD expenditures on all programs (Table I). The 1990 HUD
pay-out specifically for low-income housing programs is about
$1.6 billion (Table 2), certainly not $22.8 biltion.
It is true that HUD expenditures on low-income )ublic hous-
ing programs and low-rent public housing loans more than dou-
bled in the 1980s. In constant dollars, however, the increase is
unimpressive; in fact, corrected for inflation, HUt) expenditures
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Table 2
HUD Outlays for Low-fnconie and Low-Rent Public Housing (X $1,000)
Payments for Low-Income Low-Rent Public Iousing
Housing Programs Loans and Other Expenses
1980 755,300 159,304
1981 928,581 77,359
1982 1,007,558 -21,118
1983 1,541,558 110,603
1984 1,135,116 1,111,012
1985 1,205,020 13,885,412
1986 1,180,865 977,001
1987 1,387,985 1,355,655
1988 1,488,551 1,172,953
1989S 1,547,357 922,407
1990b 1,651,357 634,323
aChanged to 'operation of low-income housing'
bHUlD estimIe
Source: see Table 1.
at the end of the decade were nearly identical to those at the
beginning. It is also true that only a part of the total HUD bud-
get is spent on housing subsidies for the poor, and that an even
smaller share is spent on the subsidized construction of new
low-income housing. To suggest that the federal expenditure
for this purpose is anywhere close to $20 billion seems inten-
tionally misleading.
Expenditures on the homeless poor or on facilities to assist
the homeless are not tallied as a separate category in any of
HUD's documents prior to 1987. In 1987, $15,000,000 was ap-
propriated for this purpose, although no figure for the actual
outlay is provided. Also, in 1988, within the category of "Policy
Development and Research Expenditures," there was an outlay
of $2,661,000 for "supplemental assistance for facilities to assist
the homeless." Expenditures on the homeless increased in 1988
and thereafter, under provisions of the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act; these expenditures are reviewed later.
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Ferrara also remarks that the total number of families as-
sisted by HUD programs increased from 3.1 million in 1980 to
4.4 million today. But with a current poverty population in ex-
cess of 30 million, it is obvious that the I-IUD coverage rate of
households in need is very limited, whatever the total num-
ber of households receiving assistance. Table 3 shows state-by-
state coverage rates for the very low-income renter population
(not the total poverty population); the coverage is almost never
above 50% and nation-wide averages less Lhan a third (Cen-
ter for Budget and Policy Priorities, 1990). It can also be noted
that Ferrara's figures include nonpoverty households who re-
ceive HUD housing assistance, for example, the elderly (among
whom the poverty rate has been declining and who now enjoy
the lowest poverty rate of any age group in the nation).
By far the largest and most aggressive federal effort on be-
half of the homeless is the McKinney Act, enacted in 1987.
Under the terms of this act, HUD has spent more than $200
million on the Supportiyr -ousing Demionstration Program,
an expenditure frequentij cited as evidence of the Reagan ad-
ministration's willingness to solve the housing problems of the
homeless (e.g., Access, 1990). Other housing provisions within
the act have provided roughly $80 million to subsidize more
than 2,200 single room occupancy (SRO) hotels for a decade,
have underwritten the opening and operation of emergency
shelters for the homeless, and so on (see Table 4). The support-
ive housing program is a particular source of pride because it is
housing geared to the unique and diverse needs of subgroups
within the homeless population (the alcoholic, the mentally ill),
a pet theme of HUD Secretary Jack Kemp.
Close examination of the budgetary outlays from the Mc-
Kinney Act reveals that relatively little of the budget goes to
the provision of permanent low income housing; much of it is
targeted towards other purposes and populations. In 1987, to
illustrate, a total of $80 million was appropriated for the sup-
portive housing program. Of that $80 million, $20 million went
to transitional housing for homeless families, not to permanent
low cost housing. In 1988, $10(0 million was authorized for the
program but only $65 million was appropriated and of that,
$20 million was agaih for transitional, not permanent housing.
Unhousiig lhe Urban Poor
Table 3
Low-Income Housing Assistance
Number of Number of Maximum'
Renter Very Low Number of
Households Income Renter Very Low Income
State Assisted Households Renter Households
1985 1983 Assisted
Alabama 75,469 224,320 33.6%
Alaska 9,224 16,980 54.3
Arizona 34,638 139,320 24.9
Arkansas 38,709 130,840 29.6
California 336,310 1,564,110 21.5
Colorado 39,605 159,850 24.8
Connecticut 64,225 154,030 41.7
Delaware 10,422 29,060 35.9
Dist. of Columbia 28,131 69,330 40.6
Florida 134,471 587,050 22.9
Georgia 115,297 337,760 34.1
Hawaii 16,175 53,160 30.4
Idaho 9,072 40,630 22.3
Illinois 168,448 646,150 26.1
Indiana 79,052 214,860 36.8
Iowa 31,076 115,350 26.9
Kansas 26,702 103,130 25.9
Kentucky 68,314 192,420 35.5
Louisiana 69,307 261,240 26.5
Maine 21,473 54,720 39.2
Maryland 81,215 210,330 38.6
Massachusetts 144,990 347,830 41.7
Michigan 123,958 409,380 30.3
Minnesota 77,519 169,070 45.9
Mississippi 40,148 143,000 28.1
Missouri 73,636 237,110 31.1
Montana 14,346 38,290 37.5
Nebraska 22,715 67,950 33.4
Nevada 15,016 47,620 31.5
New Hampshire 16,042 40,530 39.6
New Jersey 139,169 403,040 34.5
New Mexico 21,749 69,530 31.3
New York 454,852 1,484,980 30.6
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North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total
97,754
12,311
190,309
55,721
34,491
189,449
32,398
45,692
16,827
91,364
196,290
10,039
7,077
79,566
57,263
26,844
67,385
3,915
305,8411
27,840
537,230
153,030
154,350
564,120
63,37(1
156,080
35,230
259,260
766,090
57,390
26,220
262,530
224,990
86,230
193,200
16,620
3,816,172 12,652,690
'This is a maximum because not all households receiving assistance have "Very low
incomes.' The number of "very-low ihcome" housing units in 1983 was compared
to the number of assisted units in 1985 because both sets of data are the latest
available on a state-by-stale basis.
Source: 1980 Census Data and 1983 Annual Ilnusing Survey. Data on programs
from Department of Housing, 1985 unpublished data.
As is apparent in the budgetary outlays, most of the McKin-
ney housing money has been spent in marginal ameliorations
of the worst aspects d('the housing situation of the homeless
(shelters, SROs, transitional programs, etc.); relatively little has
been invested in adding permanent units to the low income
housing supply.
Despite the claims of Kemp and others within the Bush and
Reagan administrations, the homelessness problem worsened
in the 1980s and the federal response did very little to dampen
the trends. While some monies were being spent on low in-
come housing and on programs specifically for the homeless,
the broader housing policies of the administration undid what
32.0
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Unhousing the Urban Poor
good these low-income and homelessness programs might oth-
erwise have accomplished.
In brief, housing policy in the Reagan years was two-
pronged: tax subsidies to underwrite the housing costs of up-
per income groups and a largely unrestricted private market for
lower income groups. This approach to housing policy was ide-
ologically consistent with the overall Reagan agenda of dereg-
ulation, privatization and liberation of the "Invisible Hand," as
was the evident consequence: the institutionalization of the pri-
vate market as the solution to the inadequate low income hous-
ing supply. Sadly, the private market has few if any incentives
to provide low income housing; there is much more money in
housing the rich than in housing the poor. Privatizing the low
income housing market means in essence that the federal gov-
ernment has abnegated its historical commitment to guarantee
to all citizens a minimum standard of housing adequacy.
Part of Reagan's reluctance to provide housing stemmed
from his well-known belief that many homeless people "are,
well, we might say, homeless by choice" (a spontaneous com-
ment in a press conference). A related theme in the administra-
tion was that housing conditions reflect cultural problems spe-
cific to certain ethnic groups. Regarding the doubling-up that is
associated with a housing squeeze (Mutchler and Krivo, 1989),
Philip Abrams of HUD suggested that it is ". . . characteristic of
Hispanic communities, irrelevant to their social and economic
conditions .... It is a cultural preference, I am told" (quoted in
Momeni, 1990, p. 136). Even if true, which is unlikely, the rel-
evance of this comment is uncertain since Hispanics comprise
only about a tenth of the total homeless population.
The viewpoint argued in this paper, although rather a sim-
ple one, would find little favor with Filer, Ferrara, Abrams,
Kemp, Bush, or Reagan himself. It is that homelessness is funda-
mentally a housing problem (or alternatively, that the key dis-
tinguishing feature of the homeless is that they lack an accept-
able place to live). We provide evidence on two key trends of the
1980s: the increasing rate of poverty, and the declining supply of
low income housing. Our position is that continual increases in
the number of poor people, coupled with continual decreases in
the supply of housing that poor people can afford, necessarily
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
predestines an increase in homelessness, a point made insis-
tently by scholars and analysts throughout- the decade.
Poverty and Housing during the Reagan Years
From 1978 to 198t.there was a 25% increase in the house-
holds living below the poverty line as well as an increase in
just how poor the poor are. For example, in 1985 the median
income of poor families was $4,000 beneath the poverty line; in
constant dollars, that amounts to being $600 deeper into pov-
erty than the comparable 1978 figure (Hartman and Zigas, 1989,
p. 3). That the poor "are getting poorer" has been the theme of
countless recent newspaper and magazine articles.
Over the past thirty years, the number of Americans living
below the official poverty line has varied from a low of about
23 million in 1973 to a high of nearly 40 million in 1960. Year-
to-year fluctuations in the number of the poor can be quite sub-
stantial. These annual changes, which often amount to several
million persons, result mainly from macroeconomic conditions
that affect the unemployment rate. During periods of general
economic growth (e. g., the 1960s), the rate of employment in-
creases and the number of the poor goes down. Alternatively,
during recessionary times, unemployment and therefore pov-
erty tend to increase. Other factors also influence the general
rate of poverty, but the rate of employment is probably the
most critical.
Decade by decade, the overall pattern is reasonably clear-
cut. The number of the poor declined steadily throughout the
1960s, from 40 million poor at the beginning of the decade
to about 25 million poor at the end. Not coincidentally, the
sharpest declines occurred after the onset of Johnson's War on
Poverty in 1964. Throughout the 1970s (often referred to as the
"Decade of Inflation"), the number in poverty fluctuated right
around the 25 million mark, with no obvious trend in either
direction. Then, starting in 1978, the number of the poor began
to increase, reaching the 35 million mark in 1983 and hovering
close to that number since.
The 1983 figure is of historical significance because it rep-
resents the largest number of persons in poverty ever recorded
.Unhousing Hie Ur1vin Prow
since the beginning of the War on Poverty in 1964. In five years,
the gains of the previous two decades were erased as some ten
million persons were added to the poverty count. In these re-
spects, the Reagan years can only be described as a giant step
backward.
For comparative purposes, most observers prefer to look at
the poverty rate, rather than the raw numbers. The thirty-year
trend shows that the highest poverty rates-in excess of 20% of
the population-preceded the War on Poverty. From the early
1960s through 1973 (that is, from the beginning of the War on
'Poverty to the first Arab oil embargo and the ensuing collapse of
the world economy), the rate of poverty in America was halved
(falling from 22.2% to 11.1%). From 1973 through the end of
the decade, no further progress was made and beginning about
1980, the rate began to increase, reaching a post-1965 peak of
15.2% in 1983 and remaining at mid-60s levels since. Thus, the
secular trends in the poverty rate are much the same as the
trends in the total numbers; overall, the pattern is one of consid-
erable progress in the 60s, stagnation in the 70s, and significant
deterioration in the 80s.
Not only has the number of the poor increased, but their
poverty has deepened. The total share of national income going
to the poorest tenth of the population has declined by more
than 10% in recent years; the share going to the most affluent
twentieth has increased by 37%. Accordingly, the gap between
the poverty line and the median US family incorne has widened
'(Table 5). In 1980, the "income deficit" for the poor (the distance
.between the 3-person poverty level and the median income)
was $14,458; the corresponding figure in 1988 was $22,755-a
57% increase.
In a privatized economy dictated by the laws of supply and
demand, an increase in the number of the poor and the ensu-
ing increase in the "demand" for low income housing would
automatically produce an increase in the low-income housing
supply. This has obviously not happened, simply because need
and demand are not the same thing. A demand is a need (or a
preference) backed up with cash, which the poor lack by defi-
nition. The need for low income housing is large and growing,
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Table 5
Poverty 4evels, income Deficit and Maximum Affordable Rent, 1980-1988
Year Weighteda Median b  Income Maximumd
Poverty Family Deficit Affordable
Family of Income Gross Monthly
Three Rent
1980 $6,565 $21,023 -$14,458 $218.00
1981 - 22,388 - -
1982 7,693 23,433 -15,740 256.00
1983 7,936 24,674 - 16,738 264.00
1984 8,277 26,433 -18,156 276.00
1985 8,573 27,735 -19,162 286.00
1986 8,737 29,458 - 20,721 291.00
1987c 9,056 30,970 -21,914 302.00
1988 9,436 k, 32,191 -22,755 315.00
'Moley income
bCurrent dollars
cBased on revised methodology
dBased on 40% of monthly income
but the demand (cash-backed need) is wanting. It is evident that
millions of poor people need decent housing that rents, say, for
$200 a month or less (see below), but it is foolish to see this
as an economic demand or to assume that there is profit to be
made in responding to the need.
A comparison of the number of units renting for less than
$250 a month (30% of a $10,000 annual income) and the number
of households with annual incomes under $10,000 reveals that
in 1985 there were four million fewer units than renter house-
holds needing units (Shapiro and Greenstein, 1988; from whence
Table 6). The discrepancy between the number of poor families
and the number of very low income rental housing units ex-
ists in every state. The shortage is lowest in West Virginia (11%
more low income households than low income units), highest
in California (268%) and nationwide stands at 94%. In the na-
tion as a whole, in short, there are nearly twice as many very
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Table 7
Coniparison of HUD Subsidized Housing Assishuce for Fiscal M-ars 1980-
1989
Reagan Budget
Request Funding Levels Net Additional-
(in billions) (in billions) Hlouseholds Assisted
1980 26.6 187,892
1981 24.9 158,885
1982 13.2 13.2 55,836
1983 -5.0' 8.6 53,732
1984 - 2.3' 9.9 88,345
1985 6.2 9.9 102,721
1986 .5 8.8 98,5851
1987 0 7.3 92,980
1988 3.9 7.6 75,802
1989 6.5 7.4 83,685
'Represents Reagan Administration's attempts to rescind Budget Authorily already
appropriated by Congress.
Source: Subcommittee on Housing and Communil Development of the House
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. Serial 101-9. March, 1989.
low income renter households as there are low-cost units to
accommodate them.
Despite this gap, HUD funding levels for subsidized hous-
ing assistance declined sharply from 1980 to 1989. In 1980, the
funding for this purpose stood at $26.6 billion, and in 1989, $7.4
billion (Table 7). In recent years, the number of additional fam-
ilies receiving assistance has been less than 100,000 per annum
(recall that the poverty population exceeds 30 million).
The actual housing situation is apparently even worse than
the figures so far reviewed suggest. The count of very low in-
come units shown in Table 6 may contain as many as 800,000
vacancies, nearly 20% of the total supply (Zigas and Hartman,
1989). Among other things, high vacancy rates often indicate
inadequate living conditions; many of these units are "vacant"
because they have been condemned. The number of truly
livable low-income hot, ying units available in the market is
Unhousiii8 Mhe Urban Poor
apparently not known, but is surely less than the total units
tallied in Table 6.
In contrast to claims by ACCESS and others that HUD plays
a major role in solving the housing crisis through an infusion of
funds into the system, HUD officials, in concordance with the
Reagan administration, have indicated that they are "backing
out of the business of housing" (Hartman and Zigas, 1989, p. 14).
The ideology of the Reagan administration opposed "market in-
terventions" of every sort, preferring to let the market operate,
to the extent possible, free of governmental dictate. The spend-
ing trends indicated in Table 7 reflect this ideological imperative;
the consequent gap between the need for and supply of low-
income units has surely worsened the hornelessness situation.
In the meantime, as we discuss later, federal subsidies for high-
income housing continue unabated. As others have noted, the
policies of the Reagan years amounted to socialism for the rich
and free-market capitalism for the poor.
These recent trends in the federal obligation to subsidize the
construction of low income housing reverse a long historical
commitment. The government undertook its first public hous-
ing program in 1937. That program provided federal subsidies
to amortize the cost of building low-cost housing, was admin-
istered by local housing boards, and was highly restrictive in
eligibility (Levitan, 1985). The Housing Act of 1949 established
a national goal of upgrading and augmenting the general hous-
ing stock so that every American would have a "decent home
and suitable living environment." Throughout much of the post-
War period, the housing industry was highly productive, the
concern over "inadequate housing" referred to the quality, not
quantity, of available units, and the number of relatively afford-
able suburban single-family units steadily increased.
The Housing Act of 1968 set a goal of 26 million new units
over the next decade, six million of them targeted to low-income
households (Hartman and Zigas, 1989: 8). The goal was not met
and thereafter the government refrained from setting specific,
numerical housing goals. The 1980s witnessed lowered housing
production levels across the board and a sharp diminution in the
federal low-income housing effort. To be sure, national housing
policy has always been market determined, and that has always
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worked fairly well for moderate-to-tpper income groups. That
the market does not work particularly well for lower-income
groups has been recognized in federal housing policy since the
Depression. This half-century of recognition notwithstanding,
during the Reagan administration housing policy fur the poor
has been market-based with a vengeance, much to the overall
detriment of the low-income housing supply.
Gentrification, Cqjwlo.Conversion and Displacement:
Houging Policy by Default
A market-based housing policy implies that the private sec-
tor will invest in the housing options that generate the most
profit in the shortest time. Despite the growing need for low-
income housing in the 1980s, the decade witnessed considerable
outright destruction of the low income housing supply (through
urban renewal and the "revitalization of downtown") and a
great deal more conversion of low-income to upper-income
units, through a process that has come to be known as gen-
trification. Rather than increase the number of low-rent units to
meet the growing "demand," the "market" (which is to say, pri-
vate investors) have destroyed much of the low income housing
that was there in the first place.
The process known as gentrification resulted in significant
declines in low income housing throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
According to Carliner (1987), gentrification "inverts the normal
flow of housing" from more to less affluent consumers. In the
conventional model of housing flow, older, less desirable units
are abandoned by the affluent in favor of newer housing in pre-
viously undeveloped areas; the units thus abandoned become
available to the poor. This is the "trickle down" theory of low
income housing and is much in the spirit of the Reagan admin-
istration's ideology. In the 1970s and especially in the 1980s,
however, older urban housing was sought out by affluent in-
dividuals and (typically child-less) couples for renovation and
reclamation; urban development policies throughout the nation
encouraged this practice (gentrification) as a means of making
downtown attractive once again to the middle class.The "down-
ward trickle" of housing has thereby been interrupted. Hartman
and Zigas (1989, p. 6) estimate that gentrification has resulted
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in a loss of over a million units of SRO housing in the past two
decades. In general, "demolition, rehabilitation, abandonment
and condominium conversion have lessened the number of low-
rent housing units in most major cities" (Huttman, 1990, p. 84).
Thus, "the revitalization of downtown" has been rather a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, no one can possibly object
to the razing of rotted urban slums and their replacement by
attractive boutiques, elegant restaurants, up-scale condomini-
ums and the like. There is likewise little doubt that these de-
velopments have successfully lured a segment of the middle
class (and its tax base) back into some central city areas. At
the same time, these processes have displaced large sectors of
the urban poverty population and have destroyed large tracts of
low-income housing, particular SRO housing, which has always
served as the "housing of last resort" for the most down-and-out
among the urban poverty population (Kasinet, 1986). With little
regard for the replacement of lost low-income units, many of
those displaced by gentrification have come to be permanently
displaced, which is to say homeless (Wright and Lam, 1987).
The loss of singie room occupancy units has been particu-
larly widespread and disturbing. SROs require relatively little
in the way of initial outlay and are most useful for the elderly
poor, the disabled, and other nonconventional households for
whom inner city living, with its proximity to business and trans-
portation, is a boon if not an outright necessity (Kasinet, 1986;
Hoch and Slayton, 1989; Huttman, 1990). And yet, despite the
evident need for SRO housing, its availability continues to de-
cline. For example, in San Francisco, from 1975 to 1979 alone,
17.7% of the existing SRO units were destroyed or converted,
with further losses since. Similarly, in New York City there was
an overall 60% loss of SRO hotels between 1975 and 1981 (Hoch
and Slayton, 1989). The number of New York hotels charging
less than $50 per week declined from 298 to 131 in that pe-
riod; of those dropping out of the price range, the majority are
no longer even hotels and have been converted to other uses,
mainly to condos (Kasinet, 1986: 248; Huttman, 1990).
The SRO picture is evidently the same everywhere. Den-
ver lost 29 of its 45 SRO hotels between 1971 and 1981, Seattle
lost 15,000 units of SRO housing from 1960 to 1981, and San
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Diego lost 1247 units between 1976 and 1984 (Hoch and Slay-
ton, 1989: 175). Ironically., in one city, 1,800 SRO units were
converted by the City Social Service Department to temporary
use as emergency shelter for the homeless. In some instances,
SROs have been converted to tourist hotels, for example, the
Villa Florence hotel in the Tenderloin district of San Francisco
(Huttman, 1990, p. 84); in other cases SROs have been converted
to expensive apartment or condo complexes, sometimes with fi-
nancing through Section 8 renovation funds. (On the Section 8
program generally, see below.) Whatever the end use, these con-
verted SROs no longer function as low income housing, and this
has had obvious negative consequences for the most marginal
segments of the urban poverty population.
Unfortunately, the destruction of SROs is only part of a
larger process of displacement; the loss of low-income housing
extends well beyond the SRO sector (Huttman, 1990). Based on
data from the Annual Housing Survey, Huttman estimates that
somewhere between 1.7 and 2.4 million persons are being dis-
placed annually through outright destruction of units. Razed
units are predominantly low income units; replacement units
frequently are not. For &xample, in 1.987 there were 346,500 new
apartments built nation-wide. Of these, only 23,500 (7%) rented
for less than $350 a month; 74% of these lower-income units
were occupied within 3 months. The median rent for new units
constructed in 1987 was nearly $550 per month, well beyond the
reach of low income families (Statistical Abstract, 1989: 704). In
the same vein, between 1980 and 1986, some 2300 rental and
cooperative units were built for lower income people in San
Francisco. While a positive step, it is clearly inadequate given
an estimated need for 2600 new units each year (Huttman, 1990).
Despite a growing need, the number of new low income public
housing units under construction nation-wide has been shrink-
ing since 1983 (Table 8).
Conversion to condominiums is another way in which low-
income housing is transformed into housing for the upper mid-
dle class. From 1970 to 1975, 86,000 rental units were converted
to condos; from 1975 to 1979, another 280,0(10 were converted
(Hope and Young, 1986, p. 107), with these trends no doubt
accelerating in the 1980s. Condo conversion usually results in an
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Table 8
Low Income Public Housing Units (1,000s)
Occupied Under
Year Total Units1  Construction Other2
1980 1,321.1 1,195.6 20.9 10.6
1981 1,404.0 1,229.3 51.5 123.2
1982 1,432.2 1,231.4 66.7 134.1
1983 1,483.3 1,262.5 86.7 134.1
1984 1,368.7 1,312.9 24.0 31.8
1985 1,378.0 1,344.6 9.6 19.5
1986 1,365.0 1,333.8 12.1 19.3
1987 1,371.7 1,339.1 9.5 23.2
1Under management or available for occupancy
2To be constructed or to go directly under management because no rehabilitation
needed
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1989
approximate doubling of housing costs and, according to HUD,
about two-thirds of the original occupants move out (Hope and
Young, 1986). In some cases, SRO units that once rented for
less than $200 per month have been converted to up-scale units
renting for $700 a month or more. Thus, gentrification and con-
dominium conversion are housing policies that generate high
profits for developers and provide new and elegant urban hous-
ing for the affluent, at the direct expense of housing options for
the poor. To quote the Mayor of Boston, "Just look at the money
being made by conversions. It is second only to the lottery in
the amount of money you can make in one shot" (quoted in
Wright, 1989, p. 46).
Taxes: Housing Policy for the Non-Poor
Even as the Reagan administration was cutting back on
HUD's low income housing programs and encouraging "re-
vitalization" efforts that further eroded the low-income hous-
ing supply, they also continued to support a long-standing and
very expensive program of housing subsidies for the affluent,
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namely, the provision of the tax code that allows homeowners
to deduct mortgage interest payments (and local property taxes)
from their taxable incomes. Although not usually considered an
element of housing policy, this direct tax subsidy of the housing
costs of homeowners in fact dwarfs the government's expendi-
tures on low income housing and is in that sense very much a
part of the overall policy posture of the Reagan administration.
Disallowing the home mortgage interest deduction was con-
sidered as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but the deduction
survived unscathed. Few people appreciate the magnitude of
this de facto federal subsidy for the hone-owning classes. Dol-
beare (1988, p. 39) estimates that special housing deductions-
primarily, the deduction of mortgage interest and local property
taxes from one's taxable income-cost the treasury more in two
years than did the total outlay for subsidized housing over the
last half-century. Specifically, the total federal expenditure for
low-income housing payments plus public housing operating
subsidies from 1937 through the 1.987 fiscal year amounted to
$97 billion; in two years, 1986 and 1987, the total income tax
foregone via housing-related income tax deductions amounted
to $103 billion. At present, the federal tax subsidy for middle
class housing exceeds $50 billion per year (Dolbeare, 1988, p. 39;
see also Zigas and Hartman, 1989:2; Lang, 1989; Sanjek, 1986).
The income lost to the Treasury through housing-related tax
deductions (kniown among housing specialists as the "housing
tax expenditure") doubled in the 1980s, rising from $26 billion in
1980 to more than $50 billion in 1988. Table Nine shows how this
housing subsidy is distributed across income classes. As would
be expected, the largest share-about two-thirds of the total-
goes to families with incomes in excess of $50,000 per year;
about one-tenth of a percent goes to families with incomes less
than $10,000 a year. (MpVt low-income families, of course, rent
rather than own and af therefore excluded from the benefits
of these deductions.)
Comparing these data on the annual housing tax expendi-
ture with HUD budgetary outlays (Table One) reveals that the
federal subsidy of middle-to-upper income housing exceeds the
total HUD budget by an approximate factor of two annually.
Thus, the government spends a great deal more subsidizing
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Table 9
Estimated Housdhl Inceont and Housing Subsidy Distribution, 1988
Annual Income Housing Tax Percent
Expeiiditures
Less than $10,000 $0.1 .1%
$10-19,999 1.1 2.2
$20-29,999 3.8 7.6
$30-39,999 5.4 10.7
$40-49,999 6.6 13.0
$50,000 & over 33.6 66.4
Total 50.6 100%
Source: Table 12, Dolbeare, 1988:41
the housing costs of the affluent than it does underwriting the
housing costs of the poor. Also of relevance in this connection,
Reagan's tax policies reduced the tax benefits of investment in
low-cost housing, as discussed in Lang (1989).
Vouchers and Subsidies: Housing Policy for the Poor
A major thrust of the Reagan administration's low-income
housing policy was to withdraw (as much as possible) from the
direct subsidy of new low-income housing construction and to
focus on the use of existing units to house the poor, this via the
Section 8 voucher program. Section 8 provides housing vouch-
ers for qualifying low-income households that can be used in
lieu of cash for rent. In order to qualify as a Section 8 unit,
an apartment must rent for less than a designated "fair market
value." At the same time, to prevent obvious abuses, the unit
must also meet certain housing quality standards. Landlords
providing such units receive what amounts to a guaranteed
clientele whose rents are, in essence, being paid by the federal
government. In theory, Section 8 enhances the housing purchas-
ing power (housing "demand") of the poor and this should in
turn cause landlords to increase the supply of eligible low-rent
units, either via new construction or through renovation of ex-
isting units to bring them up to the mandated quality standards.
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(Critically, Section 8 does not provide direct financing either for
new construction or for renovation; developers must find their
own financing throughprivate sources.) .
Section 8 relegates tite provision of low-income housing to
the private market. Qualifying households receive certificates
that make up the difference between what they can afford to pay
and the going price of rent. Consistent with the Reagan agenda,
this then gives poor families the freedom to find available Sec-
tion 8 housing that suits their needs and purposes; it also gives
landlords and developers the incentive to supply housing that
satisfies this new demand. Section 8 is thus a classic market
solution to the low-income housing problem.
When Section 8 was first implemented, it was assumed that
a qualifying family could afford to spend 25% of its income on
housing; the voucher made up the difference between this in-
come figure and the designated fair market rent. (Fair market
rent standards vary from city to city, as would be expected.)
The "affordability" standard was later raised to 30% of income,
to keep the total cost of the program down (Zigas and Hart-
man, 1989, p. 10; Lang, 1989, p. 77). Critically, and contrary to
a common misconception, Section 8 certificates are not consid-
ered to be entitlements given to every qualifying family; there
are a limited number of vouchers available each year and they
are given mainly to AFDC recipients.
By far the largest problem with the Section 8 program is
that apartments good enough to satisfy the quality standard
but cheap enough to satisfy the rent standard are few and far
between, this despite the supposed program incentive for pri-
vate developers to create such units (Wright, 1989, p. 48). In
fact, approximately half the households who receive a Section 8
voucher in any given year must return it unused precisely be-
cause an acceptable qualifying unit cannot be found (Carliner,
1987). Thus, Section 8 has done little to address the low-income
housing supply problem, although it has certainly made some
difference to the (relatively few) low-income families who re-
ceive certificates and find acceptable units.
Since the gap between average rents and the ability of the
poor to pay those rents has increased substantially (see below),
the annual cost of the Section 8 housing voucher program has
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also grown. In order to fund the voucher system and keep to-
tal budgetary outlays within limits, federal funding for new
construction and for rehabilitation of existing units has been
slashed; thus, the Section 8 voucher system is practically all
that remains of the federal commitment to low-cost housing.
The recent and dramatic decline in federal subsidies for
the construction of new low-income housing was shown in Ta-
ble Seven. At the same time, inflation, abandonment, conver-
sion, and gentrification have seriously diminished the available
quantity of unsubsidized low income housing (Lang, 1989). To
illustrate, in 1980 there were some 350,000 "low-to-moderate
income" housing units produced; in 1985 only 200,000 were
produced. Most of the "low-to-moderate income" housing now
coming on the market is in fact occupied by families with in-
comes above poverty but below the median income, not by the
truly poor. Many of the landlords in these developments re-
quire a stable, secure source of income and thus exclude the
neediest sectors of the population. "Low to moderate" income
households are usually not poor but rather young middle class
families on their way up (Lang, 1989; Hartman and Zigas, 1989).
When all is said and done, HUD housing programs assist
fewer and fewer new households each year, for shorter peri-
ods of time (the standard HUD commitment has been reduced
from 24 to 12 years), and at a lower dollar subsidy per unit cost
of housing. The General Accounting Office has estimated that
without additional budget. authority, tenant based programs
with five year contracts will be eliminated completely by 1991 if
new contracts are not extended (American Association for the
Aging, 1987).
Additionally, despite the growing humber of assisted house-
holds, the lag between assistance and need continues to grow.
At present, for each low-income household that receives sub-
sidized housing, there are three additional eligible households
that do not; in other words, existing subsidies supply relief to
only about a quarter of income-eligible families (Dolbeare, 1988).
Even among renters earning less than $2500 per year, fewer than
a quarter live in assisted housing.
With the supply of low-income housing continuing to shrink
and the need continuing to grow, it is not surprising that the
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waiting lists for subsidized housing have become interminably
long. The U.S. Conference of Mayors recently surveyed pub-
lic housing waiting lists in 27 large cities. The average waiting
time from application to occupancy of a subsidized unit was 22
months. In Chicago, the average applicant will wait 10 Years for
Section 8 housing and in Washington DC, 8 years. It has been es-
timated that the waiting list for subsidized public housing units
is 17 years long in New York and 20 years long in Miami (Daly,
1990: 137). The Conference of Mayor's survey also showed that
waiting lists for assisted housing have been closed in 65% of
the surveyed cities due to excess demand. In Ohio, there are
40,000 people waiting for public housing; officials from the Na-
tional Association of Housing and Redevelopment estimate that
in 1987, a half million fqtmilies nation-wide were on the waiting
lists for assisted housing,(Report to the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 1987). (Table Ten shows data on
waiting lists in selected cities.)
Reaganomics shifted the focus of federal low income hous-
ing policy away from the subsidized construction of low income
Table 10
Waiting List for Public Housing in Select Cities, I986
No. Applicants Waiting Total Units
Akron 1,720 4,784
Baltimore 13,875 17,679
Buffalo 3,039 5,069
Chicago 44,000 49,155
Greensboro 1,177 2,220
Philadelphia 8,400 20,580
Pittsburgh 2,957 9,851
Sacramento 2,755 2,791
Source: Council of Large Public Housing Authority telephone survey, July 1986
from "A new housing policy": recommendation of nrganizations anti individu-
als concerned about affordable housing in America. U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987.
Unlkiosing the Urban Poor
units and towards so called "tenant based" subsidies (Section 8
vouchers) that, contrary to theory, have not added to the hous-
ing supply. "In 1980, 81% of incremental HUD subsidized units
were new or rehabilitated Section 8 or public housing units; by
1988 that figure had fallen to 4%" (Zigas and Hartman 1989,
p. 19; see also Carliner, 1987, p. 126). So far as the remaining
"supply side" subsidies are concerned, HUD's current focus is
on projects with local governments as the housing providers.
Most of these projects are targeted to temporary shelter and
short-term services (Daly, 1990).
An additional problem for the 1990s is the possible loss of
subsidized housing units through expiration of their existing
HUD contracts. Lang (1989) estimates that there are presently
some 900,000 federally subsidized units that will be eligible for
refinancing over the next few years; in most cases, these re-
financed units will be permanently subtracted from the low-
income housing stock. Already (according to Lang), numerous
public housing projects have been either demolished or sold to
the private sector.
As indicated earlier, what remains of the federal commit-
ment to low income housing is mainly the Section 8 voucher
program. Section 8 vouchers are usually short term commit-
ments (5 years) because HUD officials initially hoped that falling
interest rates would soon render the voucher system unneces-
sary. This, of course, has not happened and is not likely to
happen anytime soon. In the interim, only a quarter to a third
of income eligible households receive any form of federal low-
income housing assistance (Zigas and Hartman, 1989: 15).
Whether the households currently receiving housing vouch-
er assistance will continue to do so is highly problematic. About
a million existing Section 8 contracts will expire between 1990
and 1994. In the face of the Reagan-induced budget deficit, the
cost of renewing them may well prove prohibitive. In this vein,
the Director of Housing and Monetary Policy for the AFL-CIO
estimates that "over a 5 year period and with a 5 year occu-
pancy renewal cycle, the cost to-the Ifederal government] of [re-
newing] 5 year vouchers for 968,000 units would increase from
$29 billion in the 1990-1994 cycle to $33.5 billion for the next 5
years" (Schecter, 1989: 149). One is entitled to doubt whether
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the federal coffers will sustain "hits" of this magnitude in what
can be referred to as the Gramm-Rudman era; if not, roughly
a million families will soon be dropped from the housing as-
sistance rolls.
It is obvious that the voucher program can only succeed if
there is an ample supply of acceptable units. Units meeting the
Section 8 rent and quality standards are in noticeably short sup-
ply, as we have already said, and the exceptionally low vacancy
rates in these units further compound the problem (Zigas and
Hartman, 1989: 12). While vacancy rates nation-wide have been
around 7-8% in recent years, the rates vary sharply by region
and by type of unit (Table Eleven). For example, vacancy rates
are lowest in the Northeast (usually around 4%). Vacancies in
larger apartments are lower still (about 3%). Nation-wide, most
vacant units are either high rent luxury apartments, suburban
units that are not available to the poor, very small units that
are not adequate for poor families, or simply substandard units
(Huttrnan, 1990). Among acceptable and adequate units within
the means of the poor, vacancy rates are minuscule. For exam-
ple, the vacancy rate of apartments renting for less than $100 a
month was only about 2% in 1989.
Conclusions
The general portrait sketched here has been drawn by many
others; the principal feature that comes consistently into view
is more poor people co\ripeting for less low income housing
(Wright and Lam, 1987; Bassuk, 1986; Dolbeare, 1988; Lang,
1989; Hartman and Zigas, 1989; Zigas and Hartman, 1989;
Huttman, 1989; Sanjek, 1986; McChesney, 1988). The overall di-
mensions of the low income housing "squeeze" are easily illus-
trated. In 1970, there were two low-income units (renting for
less than $125 a month) for each low-income renter household
(annual income below $5,000). By 1983, that situation was re-
versed; two low-income renter households for each low-income
unit (Dolbeare, 1988). In 1975, 3.7 million low-income renters
paid more than 50% of their incomes for rent; in 1983, 16 mil-
lion low-income renters paid more than 50% of their incomes
for rent, some two-fifths of the total (US Conference of May-
ors, Report to the Subcommittee, 1989). In 1983, of the 2 million
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Table 11
Vacancy Rates, 1982-1987 (%)
1982 1983 1984
Total rental
units 5.3 5.7 5.9
Inside SMSAs 5.0 5.5 5.7
Outside SMSAs 6.2 6.3 6.4
Northeast 3.7 4.0 3.7
Midwest 6.3 6.1 5.9
South 5.8 6.9 7.9
West 5.4 5.2 5.2
Units in structure:
I unit
2 or more
5 or more
3.6 3.7 3.8
6.2 6.7 7.0
6.5 7.1 7.5
Units with:
3 rooms or less 7.2 7.2 7.5
4 rooms 5.0 5.7 6.3
5 rooms 4.0 4.4 4.6
6 rooms or more 3.5 3.7 3.5
Monthly rent:
Less than $100
$100 or more
Year built:
1960 or later
1965 or later
1940 - 1959
1939 or earlier
3.4 2.5 2.7
5.4 5.7 5.9
5.3 5.9 6.6
5.6 6.2
5.2 5.4 5.6
5.5 5,6 5.3
Plumbing:
With all facilities 5.1 5.5 5.7
Lacking facilities 12.2 11.8 13.6
1985 1986 1987
6.5 7.3 7.7
6.3 7.2 7.7
7.1 8.2 7.8
3.5 3.9 4.1
5.9 6.9 6.8
9.1 10.1 10.9
6.2 7.1 7.3
3.8 3.9 4.0
7.9 9.2 9.7
8.8 10.4 11.2
8.8 10.2 10.7
6.9 8.0 8.6
5.0 5.3 5,4
3.2 3.3 3.3
3.5 2.8 2.2
6.6 7.7 9.0
7.9 9.5 11.2
6.2 6.9 7.7
5.0 5.0 5,1
6.3 7.2 7.5
13.8 14.5 16.2
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1989
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renters with incomes less than $3,000 per year, 86% paid more
than 60% of their incomes for rent (Nelson, 1990). The median
rent (in 1988) for a two bedroom apartment in San Francisco
was $850 per month; in Los Angeles, $616 a month; in Nassau-
Suffolk county (New York), $670 a month; in Washington DC,
$563 a month; in St. Louis, $419 a month; and in Houston, $400
a month (Huttman, 1990: 89). Most rental housing in the ur-
ban areas is priced well beyond the means of the poor, even
as the number of the urban poor has increased. But even the
poor have to live soiewhere. Increasingly, "somewhere" has
meant on the streets. Even more frightening is the possibility
that as many as 3.5 million additional low cost rental units will
be taken out of the housing supply over the next few years
(Lang, 1989: 17).
The U.S. Conference of Mayors concluded (in testimony be-
fore the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community De-
velopment) that none of the 27 cities they had surveyed would
be able to neet the near-term housing needs of their low income
families because of the continued federal cutbacks in housing
subsidies (1989: 293). The Subcommittee responded that from
1980 to 1989, its jurisdiction over low-income housing had been
dramatically reduced and that little (if anything) could be done.
'rhis reduction is reflected in a 72% cut in the Subcommittee's
budgetary authority for the Subsidized Housing Account and
a consequent decline in the number of households assisted by
that account, from 187,892 assisted households in 1980 to 83,685
in 1989.
As we and many others have shown, the Reagan years wit-
nessed dramatic declines in the supply of low-cost housing,
substantial increases in the poverty rate (especially in the large
cities), and drastic shifts in federal policy towards housing the
poor. A related development, one that we have not touched on,
was an increasingly stringent, even punitive, attitude towards
low-income recipients of federal assistance, a tightening of wel-
fare eligibility requirements, a reduction in the level of assis-
tance, and the "purging" of the assistance roles (Hope and
Young, 1986; Stem, 1986: 117). The inevitable consequence has
been a crisis in low-incoi housing and an increase in the num-
bers without housing, which is to say the homeless.
Uuihousing HI/C Lrban Poor
Next to adequate nutrition, suitable housing is the most ba-
sic element of social welfare and housing policy is therefore
a fundamental component of social policy in general (Esping-
Anderson, 1985). Most of the advanced industrial democrades
find it necessary to subsidize their housing supplies in order
to achieve their overall social welfare goals. In contrast, in the
United States, we have always subsidized a lower percentage of
the housing stock than virtually any other industrialized nation
(Hartman and Zigas, 1989, p. 9), a comparison that became even
less favorable in the Reagan years. For all practical purposes,
we now stand alone among the Western nations in our apparent
indifference to housing the poor.
Adequate housing has become, it seems, a privilege of the
affluent rather than a basic right of citizenship guaranteed to
all. There is obviously no philosophical or ideological objection
to the general notion of housing subsidies, since every home-
owning household that itemizes its federal income tax deduc-
tion receives one. The objection, rather, is to providing housing
subsidies to those that truly need them.
The notion that the private market would somehow take
care of the housing needs of the poor, with only a little federal
voucher assistance to those of greatest need, must be counted
as one of the great delusions of the 1980s. "The Market" was
responsible for the outright destruction of a great deal of low-
income housing as the central cities were revitalized to accom-
modate the tastes of the young and wealthy, but it provided a
meager to non-existent backflow (or downward trickle) of low-
cost housing for those displaced by the renovation effort. The
result is that hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, now
find themselves without housing and must either avail them-
selves of the good will of friends and families, utilize tempo-
rary over-night shelters, or sleep in the streets. This cannot in
good conscience even be called a housing policy. It is madness
masquerading as a "free market" ideology-perhaps the most
enduring legacy of the Reagan administration.
What can be done now to undo the harm inflicted on the
poor by the housing strategies pursued in the 1980s? There may
well be some alternative in all this to a renewed federal com-
mitment to the subsidized construction of low-income housing
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
units, but frankly, we fail to see what it might be. Unfortunately,
the size of the federal deficit (another inheritance firom the Rea-
gan years) in essence rules out any bold, new, social welfare
programs for at least the next decade, In the meantime, it is an
easy prediction that the homelessness problem will continue to
worsen and that the new Millennium will find I's still grappling
with and embarrassed by this national disgrace.
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